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Abstract
This work has been prompted by the surprising lack of mathe-
matical coherence in the common usage of some of the fundamental
entities in the theory of probability, with an inherent risk of contra-
diction. While disentangling the intricacies, we realized that the same
issue has been raised many times, with only partial solutions, notably
by Boole, Hilbert, De Finetti and Renyi, among others. In particu-
lar, a restoration of foundational coherence in the usage of probability
theory appears to be a missing piece in the solution of Hilbert VI
problem.
Here we solve the problem by a new formalization of probability
theory based on a minimal collection of axioms with additional con-
text dependent conditions, whose overall consistency is then semanti-
cally verified. In Elementary Probability, i.e. probabilities involving
boolean combinations of finitely many events, our theory leads to al-
gebraization and, using Tarski Seidenberg reduction, to a proof of
decidability of all problems. Inconsistency in Elementary Probability,
on the other hand, is equivalent to, suitably redefined, arbitrage or
Dutch Book. In the continuous case this leads to nonstandard analy-
sis.
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1. Introduction
There is a long history in the search of a theory of probabilties see e.g.
[TF1973, VP94], and Hilbert VI problem [LC2004] calls for its axiomatiza-
tion; this has been generally interpreted, most of the time by Hilbert himself,
as the quest for a collection of few axioms from which the rest of the theory
can be derived. Kolmogorov [K1956] proposed one such axiom system which,
although disputed by De Finetti and others, has lead to a clarification of the
foundations, and has become the standard accepted solution.
Yet, there are aspects which, surprisingly, have been mostly overlooked to
this day. They concern a lack of mathematical coherence in most of the ap-
plications and exercises involving probability theory. Fundamental concepts,
among which independence and conditional probabilities, are presented and
used in two inconsistent ways: in the theory, they are introduced as defini-
tions, but in the applications they are unfoundedly taken as assumptions.
Some confusion about the role of the main probabilistic concepts was rec-
ognized by Hilbert, who in 1905 indicates that ”at its present state of de-
velopment, the ”axioms” and the ”definitions” somewhat overlap with each
other” [LC2004, UK2011, DH1905]. The ”overlap” has never ceased in ap-
plications of probability. In addition, this confusion spawns a potential risk
of contradiction, as illustrated, for instance, by the exercise in Appendix A;
the consequences of inconsistency could obviously be quite severe in applied
contexts, as unwarranted conclusions, for instance about safety, might be
drawn from contradictory assumptions.
There have been several other calls and attempts at formalizing probabil-
ity theory, notably by Bohlmann [GB1901], Keynes [Ke1921], Savage, Pop-
per [Po1938], Renyi [R1955, K84], and theories like Quantum Probability
[RS2007, Pit1989b], Free Probability [B03] and Bayesian Probability, raising
diverse issues such as the use of sets in Kolmogorov axioms, the significance
of countable additivity, and again the role of independence and conditional
probabilities; none of these seems to be complete satisfactory. In parallel,
the problem of potential contradictions is explicitly mentioned in the works
of Boole [B54, Ha1976] and De Finetti [DF1980, DF1974], and later in PSAT
[N1986, HJ2000]; but these last researches consider only the linear cases, and
hence cannot deal with concepts like independence. To conclude, several
paradoxical statements have also been proposed [E2012, Ha2013, Ly2014],
often intertwined with the same lack of coherent usage of the basic concepts.
The need of a formulation which is able to deal with possible inconsisten-
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cies and other issues seems then to still be a missing piece in the solution of
Hilbert VI problem.
The possibility of inconsistencies casts a different light into the quest for
axiomatization of probability. In fact, a new system of axioms is created
every time a new problem is considered, but many problems in the analysis
of random phenomena are so immediate that the need of a consistency check
seems to be missed during the mathematical formalization. In addition, the
foundations of probability theory proposed so far, and, even more, the overall
idea that axiomatization is aimed at finding a small collection of far reaching
axioms, offer no tool to prevent inconsistencies in applied problems. Indeed,
no axiomatization prevented the exercise reported in Appendix A from being
considered appropriate.
We seem, therefore, compelled to assign an additional task to the axiom-
atization of probability; in essence, we need a flexible system which is able
to adapt to single problems, indicating both how to prevent inconsistencies
and how to preserve the calculative power of probabilistic concepts. This is
problem we treat in this paper by proposing a new formalization. We see
below that in such formalization concepts like independence and conditional
probabilities end up consistently playing a dual role, acting both as assump-
tions, whose consistency has to be checked, and as definitions, which are the
starting points of calculations. As a matter of fact, also additivity is revealed
to posses the same type of duality.
At first, the idea was a semantical consistency check: once the hypothesis
of a problem have been identified, one has to look for a probability space sat-
isfying all the hypothesis, showing thereby a relative consistency (absolute
consistency is essentially ruled out by Go¨del’s second Incompleteness Theo-
rem [G1931]). This is the procedure suggested by Model Theory, also at the
basis of moment problems and PSAT. In Section 3 we develop this direction
by introducing an algebraization of Elementary Probability which ultimately
leads to show its decidability (a result which seems to fulfill Boole’s original
claim of having a way of solving ”all problems in probability” [Ha1976]). As
PSAT is a special case of the algebraic problem we formulate in Elementary
Probability, which could be called PPSAT (Polynomial PSAT), this too in
NP-complete.
We realized, however, that, in pursuing the above direction, the specific
assumptions of each problem and the usual axioms of a probability space end
up being treated in the same way (we then name them all ”requirements”).
This offers the chance to relax the standard axioms, allowing parts of them to
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become context dependent. This is done in the paper by starting from very
basic probability spaces (related to plausibilities in quantum context), and
then introducing the notion of ”jointly perceivable” events, a notion whose
treatment ends up paralleling that of the standard collective independence.
Once the two notions are employed together one can give a coherent foun-
dation to diverse formulations of probability, each one being identified by
some requirements which are constantly taken within that formulation, with
additional ad hoc requirements in each problem. This is described in Section
2. Section 3 then goes back to Elementary Probability and its algebraization.
In Elementary Probability, we see that if there is no model satisfying
all the requirements of a problem, then one can determine a suitably rede-
fined arbitrage mechanisms, or Dutch Book (see Section 4). This generalizes
the foundational work of De Finetti, and the Fundamental Theorem of As-
set Pricing [DS08]. The construction is based on Stengle’s Positivstellensatz
[LPR2014], and shows that the assumptions of a problem are consistent if
and only if, provided some replicability of the events, it is not possible to
extract a sure profit from a believer of those requirements. Outside of El-
ementary Probability the Dutch Book method encounters some difficulties,
as its absence is no longer equivalent to existence of a model, see Section
5.1; this phenomenon is known in other contexts, and seems to require either
nonstandard analysis [HL85] or extensions of the concept of arbitrage [DS08].
Our proposed method entails several questions about logic. Following
Model Theory [TZ2012, E2006], we need to identify a formal language, a
class of structures and correspondence rules; in addition a truth predicate
[T44] would be needed to ascertain satisfiability. As there does not seem
to be an optimal choice for the language (see, e.g. [V2012]), it appears
more reasonable that in our context the language itself is chosen in relation
to the requirements, allowing the flexibility of selecting a rich model and
proof theory for simple problems, and a more expressive language for more
elaborate ones. We do not pursue these considerations further in the present
paper.
Summarizing, our proposal, which is to a large extent just a formalization
of commonly used procedures, is that the mathematical analysis of probabili-
ties should be reversed: instead of looking for axioms which capture as many
situations as possible, one can (quite freely) select a collection of assumptions
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(i.e. axioms) for each specific problem and then derive consequences from
there, with the sole additional constraint of a preliminary consistency check
(via existence of a model).
Notice that, along the way of our formalization, we also forgo the need
of having a preliminarily fixed set, a desideratum which has been raised by
several authors such as Keynes [Ke1921] or Popper [Po1938], and, in some
form, by Tao’s ansatz [T2011]. In addition, although we do not present
the details here, it is clear that our treatment allows to make a parallel
development of various formulations of probability theory, and also of some
theories which are close to that of probability, such as Choquet’s Capacity
or Shafer’s Evidence [S1976].
Throughout the paper boldface symbols such as x = (x1, x2, . . . , xk) indi-
cate vectors whose coordinates are clear from the context; δA is the Kronecker
delta function of A.
On first reading, it is possible to focus on Elementary Probability by
going directly to Appendix A and Section 3.
2. Probability
2.1. Requirements
All requirements will be set on equal footing, but we single out a minimal
collection which serves as a basis for the entire theory.
Definition 2.1. A basic probability space is a triple (Ω,A, P ) where Ω
is a set, A is a family of subsets of Ω containing Ω and ∅, and P is a real
valued function on A such that
(a) P (∅) = 0;
(b) P (Ω) = 1;
(c) for every A ⊆ B ⊆ Ω, P (A) ≤ P (B).
Elements A of A are called basic events, and P is called basic probability.
That these assumptions are not contradictory can be seen with P (A) =
δA,Ω on any set Ω.
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Note that basic probabilities appear as ”plausibilities” in quantum con-
texts [F86, FL15]. Note also that we decorate the symbols with a hat as they
represent ”concrete” structures, i.e. sets.
Standard axiomatizations of Probability Theory identify more axioms,
but, as mentioned, we are incorporating any further assumption with the
specific case by case ones; we name them all requirements.
Definition 2.2. A requirement is any statement which can hold for a basic
probability space.
Initial examples of requirements are P (A) = 1/2 or there are finitely many
events; later, when the theory is developed, requirements take more elaborate
forms like constraints on moments, a random variable being a martingale, or
a stochastic process satisfying a SPDE. Notice that here we use symbols
without bar, to express the fact that requirements are stated before specific
basic probability space or random variables are determined.
The interest is in collection of requirements:
Definition 2.3. A probability pre-environment is a quadruple
((Ω,A,P),R), in which Ω is a symbol; P is a set of symbols containing at
least P ; A is a set of symbols containing at least ∅ and Ω; R is a collection
of requirements about the symbols in (Ω,A,P).
Examples of probability pre-environments appear everywhere in the usual
development of probability theory, both at abstract levels as assumptions of
a theorem, and in problems as collections of hypothesis.
In fact, once a pre-environment is described, consequences can be derived
by a deductive calculus. This is the usual modus operandi both for theoretical
developments and for applications of probability theory.
Requirements are then stratified, in the sense that once deductions are
drawn from some requirements, further concepts can be determined which
become the basis of new requirements. For instance, one typical requirement
is that A is a σ-algebra, that there is a function X : Ω→ R measurable with
respect to A; if some additivity is required for P then one can define integra-
tion with respect to P , and then require certain properties for the moments
of X . A similar process takes place with independence (see also below).
In practice, the introduction of of requirements and pre-environments can
be seen as a merely terminological clarification of the standard probability
theory.
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Our new formalization points, however, directly to the fact that all the
deductive effort could be groundless if a contradiction is present among the
requirements. The next section gives a semantic interpretation which closes
the circle of our definitions and insures consistency; later on we discuss what
can happen with inconsistency.
2.2. Probability environments
The following definition provides at the same a more meaningful constraint on
the type of requirements which can appear in a probability pre-environment,
and model theoretical consistency.
Definition 2.4. A probability environment is a probability
pre-environment ((Ω,A,P),R) such that there exists a basic probability space
(Ω,A, P ) satisfying all the requirements.
A more precise description of how the constraint are to be satisfied in-
volves an interpretation of the symbols in the pre-environment in terms of
elements of the basic probability space. This depends on the type of logic;
a schematic description is as follows. First, A contains one element for each
member of A; next, if, in each of the requirements in R, Ω replaces Ω, the
corresponding members in A replace those in A, P replaces P , and each other
symbol in P is replaced by that of a mathematical entity defined in terms
of (Ω,A, P ), then the requirements in R hold. In such case, the elements
of A are events, P is a probability, the basic probability space is called a
(probability) model for the environment. We indicate by Ψ a map which
realizes the above correspondence.
Notice that in the above definition events are not sets, the probability is
not a function etc.
When consistency of a probability environment is ascertained, then conse-
quences can be consistently derived by inference rules. The model theoretical
determination of consistency introduces also the possibility of a semantic se-
quent calculus. We say that a statement is a possible consequence of a
probabilistic environment if the statement holds for at least one of the basic
probability spaces satisfying the requirements. A statement is a necessary
consequence if it holds for all the basic probability spaces satisfying the
requirements. Any theorem in standard probability theory is a necessary
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consequence of any environment in which the hypotheses of the theorem
itself are (a necessary consequence of the) requirements.
A particular model theoretical proof method consists in showing by model
existence that a certain probability environment ((Ω,A,P),R), exists; and
then proving that ((Ω,A,P),R′) is contradictory, where R′ equals R plus
the negation of a statement s. It follows that s is a necessary consequence
of the environment. When applied to Elementary Probability in Section [?]
below, this leads to a complete solution.
Example 1. The Uniform Distribution on n points is a Probability Envi-
ronment in which the requirements can be taken to be: Ω = {a1, . . . , an};
A contains the n + 2 symbols {∅, {a1}, . . . , {an},Ω}; P is defined on a σ-
algebra with all events being jointly perceivable; finally, P ({ak}) = c, for each
{ak} ∈ A and some constant c. To verify that this is indeed a Probability
Environment it is enough to take, for instance, Ω := {1, . . . , n},A := P(Ω),
P (A) := |A|/n, and replace each {ak} by {k}.
Alternatively: no requirements on Ω; A contains (at least) the n + 2
symbols ∅, A1, . . . , An,Ω; Ai ∩ Aj = ∅; and P (Ai) = P (Aj) for all i 6= j,
i, j = 1, . . . , n. The concrete probability space above is again a model of the
environment, with the replacement of Ak by {k} (this second formulation
satisfies Tao’s dogma about extendibility [T2011]).
2.3. Joint perceivability and mutual independence
Specific requirements can be imposed for each different problem, but there
are standard ones, such as countable additivity or independence, which set
probability theory apart from other theories. The imposition of such re-
quirements is facilitated by suggestive definitions. This has always been the
case with independence, which as mentioned plays the role of a requirement
in applications, and we now introduce a novel notion for additivity; among
other things, it brings about the potential to unify diverse formulations of
probability theory.
Definition 2.5. In a probability environment ((Ω,A,P),R), a collection of
events A = {Ai}i∈I , Ai ∈ A, is jointly perceivable (for P ) if P is countably
additive on σ(A), i.e for every countable subcollection of disjoint events Ai ∈
σ(A), P (∪∞i=1Ai) =
∑∞
i=1 P (Ai). The events in A are also called jointly
perceivable.
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Notice that with this definition, additivity, now renamed joint perceiv-
ability, plays both the role of an assumption and that of a definition, as
much as independence is now doing. This parallelism is further developed
here below.
When the requirements on (Ω,A, P ) are that A is a σ-algebra of jointly
perceivable events, we say that (Ω,A, P ) is a Kolmogorov probability
space. That these requirements are consistent, and hence define a probabil-
ity environment, can be verified by taking any Ω, A = {Ω, ∅} and P = δΩ
(the semantic consistency check is essentially verabatim cited from [K1956]).
When the requirements on (Ω,A, P ) are that A is a algebra and that all
finite collections of events are jointly perceivable, we say that (Ω,A, P ) is a
finitely additive probability space.
In other cases joint perceivability might hold for some but not for all
finite collections of events. This is the case in test spaces which appear in
Quantum Mechanics [FR72, W09, FL15] as well as in other contexts, e.g.
[C10].
The notion of joint perceivability has been phrased in a way that makes
it comparable to the slightly adapted usual one of mutual independence.
Definition 2.6. In a probability environment ((Ω,A,P),R), a collection of
events A = {Ai}i∈I , Ai ∈ A is mutually independent if for all disjoint
classes Ai, i ∈ I, I any set of indices, Ai ⊆ A, P is countably moltiplica-
tive on the product ⊗i∈Iσ(Ai), i.e for every countable collection of events
Ai ∈ σ(Ai), P (∩
∞
i=1Ai) =
∏∞
i=1 P (Ai). The events Ai are called mutually
independent.
To illustrate the parallelism between the concepts of joint perceivability
and mutual independence, we call finitely jointly perceivable a collection
A of events in which additivity holds for all finite collections of elements of
σ(A), and finitely mutually independent a collection A for which factorization
occurs for all finite products ⊗ni=1σ(Ai) of disjoint collections Ai ⊂ A.
In some cases both joint perceivability and mutual independence are fi-
nite: take Ω = N and U an ultrafilter; then P (A) = δU(A) is both finitely
mutually independent and finitely jointly perceivable on A = P(N), but nei-
ther is countable. However, if one is countable and the other finite, then the
other is countable too.
Theorem 2.7. Let (Ω,A, P,R) be a probability environment, and A ⊆ A.
If A is jointly perceivable and finitely mutually independent, then it is also
(countably) mutually independent.
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If A is mutually independent and finitely jointly perceivable, then it is also
(countably) jointly perceivable.
Proof. (I) As (Ω, σ(A), P ) is Kolmogorov, the first statement follows from
standard probability theory (see, for instance, [K02] pp. 51, 60).
(II) In the other direction, let A0 = Ac and A1 = A, and consider
F = {∩kℓ=1A
αℓ
ℓ , k ∈ N, Aj ∈ Q, αj = 0, 1} ∪ {∅,Ω}.
Clearly, A,B ∈ F implies A ∩ B ∈ F ; A = ∩kℓ=1A
αℓ
ℓ ∈ F implies A
c =
∪α 6=α ∩
k
ℓ=1 A
αℓ
ℓ ; hence, F is a semialgebra containing A and P is finitely
additive on F .
To show that P is countably additive on F consider A ∈ F such that
∩kℓ=1A
αℓ
ℓ = A = ∪
∞
j=1A(j), A(j) = ∩
kj
ℓ=1A
αj,ℓ
ℓ (j) ∈ F , A(j) disjoint. We now
focus on the countable family
A˜ = {A
αj,i
i (j), j ∈ N, 1 ≤ i ≤ kj} ⊆ A.
Let’s fix an order of the elements of A˜ and relabel them B1, B2, . . . . Then we
consider the map T : Ω → {0, 1}N, such that T (ω) = (δB1(ω), δB2(ω), . . . ).
T is measurable with respect to the Borel σ-algebra in {0, 1}N, and the σ-
algebra σ(A˜). In fact, for each cylinder C = Cβ1,...,βki1,...,ik = {ρ ∈ {0, 1}
N : ρim =
βim} we have T
−1(C) = ∩km=1B
βm
im . It follows that σ = T (P ) is a finitely ad-
ditive probability on {0, 1}N; furthermore, σ(Cβ1,...,βki1,...,ik ) = P (∩
k
m=1B
βm
im
) =∏k
m=1 P (B
βm
im
) by independence of the Bj’s under P . Hence, for Hk =
{0, 1},Ak = P(Hk), γk the countably additive probability on Ak such that
γk(1) = P (Bk), H = H
∞, σ is a finitely additive probability on H such that
for Dk ⊆ Hk
σ(×∞ℓ=1Dℓ) = P (T
−1(×∞ℓ=1Dℓ))
= P (∩∞ℓ=1T
−1(Dℓ)) =
∞∏
k=1
P (T−1(Dk)) =
∞∏
k=1
γk(Dk) (1)
again by countable independence of P .
These are the conditions used in [D74, PS76], see also [K82], to show that
there exists a unique finitely additive probability P˜ , satisfying the further
condition (2) below, such that (3) holds for P˜ . As (3) holds for σ, if it
satisfies the condition below then σ = P˜ = ⊗∞k=1γk. Hence, σ is countably
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additive on the Borel σ-algebra of H . It the follows that P is countably
additive on σ(A˜). The condition to check from [D74, PS76] is that for all
clopen subsets D of ×∞ℓ=k+1Hk,
σ(D) =
∫
×kℓ=1Hk
σ(D(x1, . . . , xk))d⊗
k
ℓ=1 γk((x1, . . . , xk)) (2)
whereD ⊆ H,D(x1, . . . , xk) = {z = (z1, z2, . . . ) ∈ H : (x1, . . . , xk, z1, z2, . . . ) ∈
D}. In the present case, (2) holds by independence and finite additivity, as
σ(D) = σ(∪(x1,...,xk)(D(x1, . . . , xk) ∩ (ρ1 = x1, . . . , ρk = xk))
=
∑
(x1,...,xk)
σ((D(x1, . . . , xk) ∩ (ρ1 = x1, . . . , ρk = xk)) (3)
=
∑
(x1,...,xk)
σ((D(x1, . . . , xk))γk((ρ1 = x1, . . . , ρk = xk))
=
∫
×kℓ=1Hk
σ(D(x1, . . . , xk))d⊗
k
ℓ=1 γk((x1, . . . , xk))
If A is countable then the proof would be finished. For general A we observe
that the countable additivity of P on σ(A˜) for each A˜ implies that P is
countably additive on F .
(III) Consider now a Stone representation [YH52, S16] in which for a
finitely additive probability µ on a measurable space (Ω,A), with A a σ-
algebra, there are a compact measurable space (Ωˆ, Aˆ), and a measurable
map ψ : Ω → Ωˆ, with ψ(Ω) dense in Ωˆ, such that ψ(E) has a unique
extension Eˆ ∈ Aˆ, and there is a unique countably additive probability µˆ
on (Ωˆ, Aˆ) determined by µˆ(Eˆ) = ψ(µ)(ψ(E)) for each E ∈ A. Notice that
the extension is monotone as Eˆ can be defined as the closure, in a suitable
topology, of ψ(E): E1 ⊆ E2 implies that Eˆ1 ⊆ Eˆ2 as (see [S16] [YH52]). The
probability µˆ(Ωˆ \ ψ(Ω)) of the corona Ωˆ \ ψ(Ω) is the deficiency of µ [S16].
(IV) As P is countably additive on a semialgebra F generating σ(A)
from Part (II) above, then it has a unique countably additive extension P ca
to σ(A) (by standard extension theorem [K02]).
From Part (III) we have Pˆ defined, and countably additive, on ˆσ(A). Let
L = {E ⊆ Ω : P ca(E) = Pˆ (Eˆ)}. Clearly, F ⊆ L, as for each E ∈ σ(A)
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P ca(E) = P (E) = Pˆ (Eˆ), and F is a π-system. Moreover, A,B ∈ L, A ⊆ B
implies
P ca(B \ A) = P ca(B)− P ca(A)
= Pˆ (Bˆ)− Pˆ (Aˆ) = Pˆ (Bˆ \ Aˆ)
where the last equality holds as Aˆ ⊆ Bˆ by the monotonicity of theˆextension;
also for an increasing sequence Ai ∈ L
P ca(∪∞i=1Ai) = lim
i
P ca(Ai)
= lim
i
Pˆ (Aˆi) = Pˆ (∪
∞
i=1Aˆi)
where again the last equality holds by the monotonicity of the ˆ extension.
Hence, L is a λ-system, and the π-λ-theorem implies that σ(A) ⊆ L. It
follows that for all E ∈ σ(A), P ca(E) = Pˆ (Eˆ) = P (E), i.e. P ca = P , and P
is countably additive on σ(A).
This theorem underlines once again the fact that results about indepen-
dent sequences which are valid in a countably additive setting can be proven
in the finitely additive setting as well (see, e.g. [K82]).
2.4. Arbitrage or Dutch Books
If a contradiction is derived, by deductive rules, in a probability pre-environment,
then this is inconsistent. This derivation can be eased on some occasions by
the method of Arbitrages, or Dutch Books. Informally, a Dutch Book is
a rigging strategy in which an individual is lead to believe that a certain
game is worth playing, while (s)he is losing some strictly positive amount
every time; equivalently, it can be defined as a betting scheme to extract a
sure profit from an incoherent agent forced to accept any bet on his betting
quotients [V2016]. More formally,
Definition 2.8. Given a probability pre-environment, a weak Dutch Book
against the believer of the pre-environment is a an additional random variable
V , with expectation operator E, added to the probability pre-environment,
with the additional requirements that
1. if X = IA, the indicator function of an event in A, then E(IA) = P (A);
2. E is linear on the indicator functions;
13
3. if X ≥ Y are random variables on which E is defined, then E(X) ≥
E(Y );
4. V ≤ 0;
5. E(V ) > 0.
A (strict) Dutch Book is as above, but with 4. and 5. replaced by 4′.
V ≤ −1 and 5′. E(V ) ≥ 0, respectively. In case a Dutch Book exists we
call a believer of the inadmissible requirements an incorrect evaluator of
probabilities
Example 2. If we require that an event A has P (A)+P (Ac) = 2 and A and
Ac are jointly perceivable, then let V = IA+ IAc−2. For any basic probability
space (Ω,A, P ) and any ω ∈ Ω, V (ω) = −1, but based on the requirements
of the pre-environment E(V ) = P (A) + P (Ac)− 2 = 0. So V is the a strict
Dutch Book.
In a limited form, use of Dutch Books to define probability has been
proposed by De Finetti [DF1993, DF1980].
If V is a strict Dutch Book then V − 1 is a weak Dutch Book. Moreover,
if there is a weak Dutch Book then no basic probability space satisfying the
requirements of a pre-environment can exist, as for any random variable V
on a basic probability space with V ≤ 0 it holds that, whatever the definition
of expectation, E(V ) ≤ 0 by monotonicity of expected values.
In some cases, such as for finitely many requirements on finitely many
events, also the opposite holds, and absence of a Dutch Book guarantees the
existence of the environment, see Section 4 below. In general, the situation
is more complex: in Section 5.1 below we see that for countably many re-
quirements absence of Dutch Books can be compatible with distributions on
hyperreals, while no standard distribution exists.
3. Elementary Probability
In this section we consider the theory of probabilities for finitely many events
from the point of view of starting from a collection of assumptions (i.e. re-
quirements for a probability environment) and looking for a model satisfying
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them (i.e. checking semantic consistency). After observing that most prob-
lems can be expressed in terms of real variables, we define Elementary Proba-
bility as the collection of problems involving finitely may algebraic relations,
and show its decidability.
3.1. Probabilities involving a finite number of events
A general framework for dealing with finitely many events consists of taking
the following requirements for a probability pre-environment (Ω,A, P ) (i.e.
fixing some symbols and imposing requirements on them):
1. no requirements on Ω;
2. A contains at least n+ 2 events Ω, A1, . . . , An, ∅;
3. all finite collections of events are jointly perceivable under P , i.e. P is
fully additive;
4. further requirements on P are determined by a collection of expressions
of the form
gr = gr(P (B1(A1, . . . , An)), . . . , P (Bk(r)(A1, . . . , An))) ⊳ 0, r ∈ R, (4)
where R is a set of indices of any possible cardinality, the gr’s are real
valued functions, the Bj(A1, . . . , An)’s, j = 1, . . . , k(r), are boolean
combinations of some of the A1, . . . , An’s, k(r) is an integer, and ⊳
indicates one of =, 6=,≥ (notice that all other inequalities, including >,
can be obtained combining relations with the above values of ⊳).
Lemma 3.1. The above family of requirements is semantically consistent,
i.e. determines a probability environment, if and only if the following hap-
pens.
For every j = 1, . . . , k let Bj be expressed in disjunctive normal form
Bj = ∪α∈ΣjA
α [HM2001] for the appropriate Σj ⊆ Σ = {−1, 1}
n, A−1 = Ac,
A1 = A and Aα = ∩ni=1A
αi
i . Consider then the change of variables xj =∑
α∈Σj
yα, using the 2
n variables y = {yα}α∈Σ, one for each of the A
α. Then
the family of requirements is admissibile if and only if the system of equations
and inequalities
gr(x1(y), . . . , xk(y)) = gr(
∑
α∈Σ1
yα, . . . ,
∑
α∈Σk
yα) ⊳ 0∑
α∈{−1,1}n yα = 1
yα ≥ 0
(5)
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obtained by the change of variables xj = xj(y), together with the additional
conditions of normalization and nonnegativity, admits a (real) solution y =
(yα)α∈Σ.
Proof. Clearly, if there is a concrete probability space (Ω,A, P ) with events
Ai ∈ A in one to one correspondence with the Ai’s, satisfying all the re-
quirements, the values yα = P (A
α) form a set of solutions to the the system
gr(x1(y), . . . , xk(y)) ⊳ 0, as all events are jointly perceivable (i.e. P is fully
additive).
Viceversa, if a solution y = {yα}α∈Σ exists, then take Ω = {−1, 1}
n, for
each ω ∈ Ω let P (ω) = yω, Ai = {ω : ωi = 1}, A equal to the σ-algebra
generated by the collection of the Ai’s, and, finally, P additive (which implies
that all events jointly perceivable. It is easy to verify that P (∅) = 0, P (Ω) =
1, P is monotone, and satisfies all the requirements (i.e. there is a basic
probability space realizing the environment). The requirements are then
admissible are requested.
Notice that a solution of (4) expressed in terms of the x variables does
not imply consistency of the requirements, as these relations are still missing
the requirements about additivity (i.e. joint perceivability) and non nega-
tivity of probabilities; only absence of a solution could be used to ascertain
inconsistency.
Lemma 3.1 suggests a classification of probability environments for finitely
many events in terms of the number of equations and inequalities and the
type of functions appearing in them. Some problems, such as maximal en-
tropy, involve uncountably many or non polynomial gj ’s; in most situations,
however, the requirements involve only finitely many polynomial equations
and inequalities. In addition, in all problems involving macroscopic events
P is naturally taken as additive (i.e. all events are jointly perceivable). It is
natural to call this class of problems (Classical) Elementary Probability.
3.2. Algebraization and decidability of Elementary Probability
In Elementary Probabilty, Requirement 4. above becomes
4′. the requirements on P are determined by a finite collection of expres-
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sions of the form
∑
0≤ρ1,...,ρk≤s
aρ1,...,ρk(r)
k∏
j=1
(P (Bj(A1, . . . , An)))
ρj ⊳ 0, r ∈ R (6)
where the Bj(A1, . . . , An)’s are boolean combinations of some of the
A1, . . . , An’s, ⊳ ∈ {≥,=, 6=}, aρ1,...,ρk(r) ∈ R, R ⊂ N is a finite set of
integers, the ρj ’s, s and k are integers.
Corollary 3.2. The consistency problem for probability environments in El-
ementary Probability is decidable.
Proof. If there are only a finite number of equations and inequalities involv-
ing polynomial gr’s, then Lemma 3.1 implies that the admissibility prob-
lem is equivalent to the nonemptyness of the semialgebraic set defined by
the polynomial relations gr = gr((x(y))) ⊳ 0, r = 1, . . . , m, together with∑
α∈{−1,1}n yα = 1 and yα ≥ 0, in the variables yα’s.
Using Tarski-Seidenberg elimination and Sturm’s theorem [BCR1998], the
existence of a solution is decidable in a finite number of steps.
Notice that Tarski-Seidenberg and Sturm’s theorems are purely existential
results, establishing existence or absence of solutions of polynomial equations
and inequalities even in cases in which the solutions cannot be explicitly
found.
We now have a procedure to check consistency in Elementary Probabil-
ity: state the assumptions of a problem or a potential application, write
them in algebraic form, check consistency by Tarski-Seidenberg elimination
or an alternative algorithm [BPR06], proceed with derivation of (now safely
consistent) consequences as usual. As a very simple example, in Appendix
B the contradictory problem of Appendix A is formally analyzed by means
of algebraization. Another example is in Appendix C.
We can, however, make a further step as probability environments allow
model theoretical proofs of necessary consequences of the requirements (i.e.
derivation of a consequence if all models satisfy it). Indicating the negation
of a relation g(x) ⊳ 0, with x ∈ Rd, by g(x)❆⊳ 0, we have:
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Corollary 3.3. If
g|R|+1(P (B1(A1, . . . , An)), . . . , P (Bk(A1, . . . , An))) ⊳ 0 (7)
is an elementary probability relation, then it is a necessary consequence of
the probability environment described by the requirements 1., 2., 3., 4.′ if and
only if the system (5) augmented by the relation g|R|+1(x1(y), . . . , xk(y))❆⊳ 0
admits no solutions. Such consequentiality is then decidable.
Proof. In a probability environment the system (5) has at least one solution.
If one such solution is also a solution of the augmented system, then there
exists a basic probability space in which the requirements and the negation of
(7) hold, hence the statement cannot be a necessary consequence. Viceversa,
if no solution of (5) solves the augmented system, then (7) holds in all the
basic probability spaces which are probabilistic models of the requirements,
hence it is a necessary consequence.
As the existence of solutions is decidable, so is the above deduction rule.
This allows to change the last step in the solution of problems in Ele-
mentary Probability: express the negation of the potential consequence in
algebraic form, use again Tarski Seidenberg elimination or another algorithm
to verify that there is no longer a solution. If it is so, then the consequence
is proven. See the last part of Appendix C for an example.
Albeit NP complete, the method in Corollary 3.3 solves thus ”all prob-
lems” in Elementary Probability, at least in principle. The same claim has
been made by Boole [B54], without being able to complete his program.
3.3. Relation with semialgebraic geometry
Semialgebraic sets of any degree emerge in discussing satisfiability in Ele-
mentary Probability, for instance with mutual independence of many events.
On the other hand, it is easy to see that each semialgebraic set included
in some nonnegative n-dimensional simplex of the form Σk = {(x1, . . . , xk) :
xi ≥ 0,
∑k
i=1 xi = 1} can be interpreted as a description of admissibility of re-
quirements for some probability environment with jointly perceivable events
(i.e. fully additive probability). It is possible to use, for instance, disjoint
events.
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Theorem 3.4. Each semialgebraic set included in some nonnegative simplex
of the form Σk can be expressed as the set of conditions for satisfiability of a
probability environment in classical Elementary Probability.
Proof. Let gr(x1, . . . , xk) ⊳ 0, r = 1, . . . , m+ k+1, be a system of polynomial
relations describing a semialgebraic set included in Σk. We can always assume
that the last relations are xj ≥ 0 for j = 1, . . . , k, and
∑k
j=1 xj = 1; in
addition, we have
gr(x1, . . . , xk) =
∑
ρ1,...,ρk: 0≤ρi≤s for i=1,...,k
aρ1,...,ρk(r)
k∏
j=1
x
ρj
j (8)
for r = 1, . . . , m, where s is the overall maximal degree of any variable in
any of the polynomials gr, r = 1, . . . , m, and aρ1,...,ρk(r) are, possibly zero,
coefficients.
Next, for the given k, consider the requirements 1., 2., 3. and 4.′ for a
probability environment in which n := k, Bj = Bj(A1, . . . , Ak) := Aj ∩
∩i 6=jA
c
i , and the polynomial relations in 4.
′ are gr(P (B1), . . . , P (Bk)) ⊳ 0.
As in Lemma 3.1, consider the variables xj := P (Bj), j = 1, . . . , k and
the variables yα. For α(j) = (2δ1=j − 1, . . . , 2δk=j − 1) we have xj = yα(j).
The complete system of polynomial relations becomes gr(yα1, . . . , yαk)⊳0, r =
1, . . . , m,
∑k
j=1 yαj = 1,
∑
α yα = 1, and yα ≥ 0 for all α. Combining the last
three sets of relations, one gets that necessarily yα = 0 for all α 6= α(j) for all
j. Hence, only the relations gr(yα(1), . . . , yα(k))⊳0, r = 1, . . . , m,
∑k
j=1 yα(j) =
1 and yα(j) ≥ 0 for j = 1, . . . , k are left, which form a system coinciding with
the original one.
The requirements formulated to reproduce a general semialgebraic set
have no real probabilistic content, but depending on the specific case, one
can sometimes obtain more meaningful problems.
4. Elementary Probabilities via Dutch Books
In this section we prove that if a finite number of polynomial requirements
are stated upon probabilities of boolean combinations of finitely many events,
then the requirements determine a probability environment if and only if
no Dutch Book can be realized against the believer of such requirements.
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Besides its intrinsic interest, a reason for developing such equivalence is that
it may be computationally advantageous in certain cases with respect to
Tarski Seidenberg elimination or related algorithms [Pa2004, BPT2013, L10].
For the definitions see Section 2.
4.1. Dutch Books in Elementary Probability
Theorem 4.1. The requirements of an elementary probability pre-environment
with n events are not consistent if and only if, assuming that it is possible
to realize a, finite but sufficiently large, number of i.i.d., joinly perceivable,
copies of the collection of events, it is possible to realize a weak Dutch Book
against any incorrect evaluator believing such requirements.
Some care must be used in interpreting the content of this theorem. When
talking about an (incorrect) evaluator of elementary probability we intend
that (s)he has determined a phenomenon in which (s)he can identify the
various events which enter into the requirements. One of the assumptions in
the theorem is that it is possible to find or produce a, finite but sufficiently
large, number of phenomena in each of which the evaluator is lead to identify
”copies” of the original events, in such a way that the original and all these
copies are jointly perceivable and collectively independent.
Proof. Consider requirements of the type 1., 2., 3. and 4′. for a problem in
Classical Elementary Probability, involving events Ai1 , i1 = 1, . . . , n. Feasi-
bility of the requirements is equivalent, by Corollary 3.2, to nonemptiness of
the semialgebraic set defined by the polynomial relations gr = gr((x(y))) ⊳ 0,
r = 1, . . . , m, together with
∑
α∈{−1,1}n yα = 1 and yα ≥ 0, in the variables
yα’s.
By distinguishing the three possible values of ⊳, we can assume that the
polynomial relations can be expressed as follows:
fr(y) = 0, r = 1, . . . , m1
gr(y) ≥ 0, r = m1 + 1, . . . , m1 +m2
hr(y) 6= 0, r = m1 +m2 + 1, . . . , m1 +m2 +m3 = m
′.
(9)
By the positivstellensatz (see [Kr1964, S1974, BCR1998]), the system has no
solution if and only if the following happens. There exists a polynomial F in
the ideal generated by the fr’s in R[y], a polynomial G in the cone generated
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by the gr’s in R[y] and a polynomialH in the multiplicative monoid generated
by the hr’s in R[y] such that
F +G+H = 0. (10)
More explicitely, there are polynomials tr ∈ R[y], r = 1, . . . , m1; sJ ∈
R[y], J ⊆ {m1+1, . . . , m1+m2} which are sums of squares; and even integers
kr, r = m1 +m2 + 1, . . . , m1 +m2 +m3, such that
v(y) =
m1∑
r=1
trfr +
∑
J⊆{m1+1,...,m1+m2}
sJ
∏
r∈J
gr +
m1+m2+m3∏
r=m1+m2+1
(hr)
kr = 0 (11)
([BCR1998]).
We need to investigate the polynomial (11) as a polynomial in the yα’s
before taking into account that all its coefficients are zero. As such, let να
be maximal power of the variable yα, and consider ν =
∑
α∈{−1,1}n να; next,
list the α’s in some fixed order α1, . . . , αn¯; for each γ ∈ {1, . . . , n¯} let Σ
(αγ )
be the set of all permutations σ(αγ ) = (σ
(αγ)
i ), i = 1, . . . , ναγ of integers
{
γ−1∑
γ′=1
ναγ′ + 1, . . . ,
γ∑
γ′=1
ναγ′}. (12)
We take ν independent, jointly perceivable copies of the events identi-
fied by the incorrect evaluator. We then form a random variable, basically
by replacing each occurrence of the variables yα’s in (11) by the indicator
function Iα,(j) that the j-th independent copy, with j to be determined, of
the event Aα takes place, and then summing the fully replaced polynomial
over all permutations of the indices of the copies. We need to specify how
to choose the copy to be used for each replacement. We do this in steps for
each selection {σ(α)}α∈{−1,1}n of a permutation for each α:
1. consider each of the polynomials trfr, sJ
∏
r∈J gr and
∏m1+m2+m3
r=m1+m2+1
(hr)
kr
separately.
2. In each such polynomial u consider one of its factors at a time using
the factorization in which they are already expressed (for instance tr
and fr for those in the ideal);
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3. expand out completely each such factor into a sum of monomials; con-
sider each monomial separately and if in such a monomial the vari-
able yα appears at some power m
(1)
α , then replace it by the product∏m(1)α
j=1 Iα,(σ(α)j )
; repeat for all variables in y. Decorate the symbol of
the factor by a tilde to indicate the random variable thus obtained, so
that tr is changed into t˜r = t˜
σ(α)
r , for instance; notice that, although we
will drop the dependency, the random variable depends on the fixed
permutation σ(α).
4. Consider the second factor of u; repeat the previous step, with this
change: if the variable yα appears at some power m
(2)
α , then replace it
by the product
∏m(2)α
j=m
(1)
α +1
I
α,(σ
(α)
j )
.
5. Repeat, always using I
α,(σ
(α)
j )
referred to new j’s and hence additional
copies, till all factors of u have been changed; notice that the total
number of copies of Aα used in the procedure is not greater than να.
6. Consider the next polynomial from the list in point 1., and repeat steps
2.-5. till all polynomials in 1. have been changed.
The above procedure produces a random variable
u˜(σ(α)) =
m1∑
r=1
t˜rf˜r +
∑
J⊆{m1+1,...,m1+m2}
s˜J
∏
r∈J
g˜r +
m1+m2+m3∏
r=m1+m2+1
(h˜r)
kr .
Let then V =
∑
all permutations{σ(α)}α∈{−1,1}n
u˜(σ(α)).
We compute the expected value of v˜ according to the incorrect evaluator.
Consider one of the polynomials in point 1. after substituting the variables
with the indicator functions as above; any two of its factors contain indicator
functions which refer to different copies of the space, by (12). Therefore, the
incorrect evaluator would consider all factors as independent, and factorize
the expected value of the product. Similarly, in each monomial inside each
factor, the variables were also substituted with indicator functions which
refer to different copies of the space by 3. and the fact that the σ’s are
permutations; hence, indicator functions in each monomial are considered
independent by the incorrect evaluator. We have thus that he/she would
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compute the expected value of the product of the indicator functions which
has replaced the variables of a monomial
∏
α y
kα
α as
E(
∏
α
∏
j∈Jα
I
α,σ
(α)
j
) =
∏
α
(P (Aα))kα
for some set of distinct integers Jα of cardinality kα. In addition, all events
are jointly perceivable, so that the expectation is linear on the sum of mono-
mials. Hence, the incorrect evaluator would compute E(u˜(σ(α))) as the cor-
responding polynomial in y with the yα’s replaced by the P (A
α)’s. This is
the value for which he/she thinks that the relations in (9) hold. It follows
that, if y indicates the value of y with the above substitutions, the incorrect
evaluator would compute, again by linearity of the expected value due to
joint perceivability:
E(V ) =
∑
all permutations {σ(α)}α∈{0,1}n
E(u˜(σ(α)))
=
∑
all permutations
 m1∑
r=1
E(t˜r)E(f˜r) +
∑
J⊆{m1+1,...,m1+m2}
E(s˜J)
∏
r∈J
E(g˜r)
+
m1+m2+m3∏
r=m1+m2+1
(E(h˜r))
kr
)
=
(∏
α
ν(α)!
) m1∑
r=1
tr(y)fr(y) +
∑
J⊆{m1+1,...,m1+m2}
sJ(y)
∏
r∈J
gr(y)
+
m1+m2+m3∏
r=m1+m2+1
(hr(y))
kr
)
≥
(∏
α
ν(α)!
)
m1+m2+m3∏
r=m1+m2+1
(hr(y))
kr > 0
from the equalities and inequalities in (9), and the properties of the polyno-
mials sJ and the powers kr.
We finally evaluate V for each possible realization of events in the collec-
tion identified by the incorrect evaluator and in all the copies. First, expand
v˜ completely, and then collect all terms corresponding to random variables
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which have replaced the same monomial
∏
α y
kα
α . For each such monomial,
there is a certain number m of terms, with coefficients c1, . . . , cm; we have∑m
i=1 ci = 0 as the corresponding monomial in the expansion of the l.h.s of
(11) has zero coefficient. When taken with the indicator functions replacing
the variables, the sum is not immediately zero, as the indicator functions re-
fer to different copies. On the other hand, keeping track of the permutation
and indicating by σαj (i) the permutation used in such monomial when the
coefficient is ci, we have that all the random variables related to the same
monomial add up to∑
all permutations
m∑
i=1
ci
∏
α
∏
j∈Jα
I
α,σ
(α)
j (i)
=
m∑
i=1
∑
all permutations
ci
∏
α
∏
j∈Jα
I
α,σ
(α)
j (i)
=
m∑
i=1
ci(ν −
∑
α:Jα 6=∅
να)!
∑
permutations:Jα 6=∅
∏
α
∏
j∈Jα
I
α,σ
(α)
j (i)
=
(ν − ∑
α:Jα 6=∅
να)!
∑
permutations:Jα 6=∅
∏
α
∏
j∈Jα
I
α,σ
(α)
j (1)
 m∑
i=1
ci
= 0
where the penultimate equality derives from the fact that in each product all
the terms I
α,σ
(α)
j (i)
refer to the same number of different copies by construc-
tion, and hence the sum over all permutations does not depend on i.
Therefore, if the payoff of a game is V , the incorrect evaluator is willing
to pay an entry fee to participate, but the game ends up being a draw all
the time. This is the weak Dutch Book mentioned in the statement of the
theorem.
Some remarks. The amount of the entry fee cannot be predicted in ad-
vance but only determined when the terms in (11) are computed,
It is possible to give bounds on the number of copies of the given events,
based on bounds on the number of polynomials used in Stengle’s Theorem
[LPR2014] and the number of permutations. But such bounds are far from
optimal.
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The random variable V obtained above, representing the payoff in the
Dutch Book, is often not the best possible option, especially because a large
number of permutations has been introduced. For an actual determination
of a game one can often select the copies more carefully so as to set up a
game which is more obviously ”advantageous” for the incorrect evaluator.
In the Appendix D there is a very simple example, worked out completely
including an alternative choice for the V .
One could observe that it is not obvious that the incorrect evaluator is
capable of computing E(V ) according to his or her own assumptions, and that
exploitation of incorrect probability evaluations is a (possibly deplorable) art
in itself.
4.2. Variations
Corollary 4.2. If the inadmissible requirements for a finite number of events
contain no strict inequalities then, assuming the possibility of producing mu-
tually independent, jointly perceivable copies of the events, a strict Dutch
Book can be realized against any incorrect evaluator believing such require-
ments.
Proof. If there are no strict inequalities in the requirements, since normaliza-
tion and nonnegativity of probabilities correspond also to inequalities which
are not strict, there are no strict inequalities in (9). Hence, we can take
h = 1, and this generates the multiplicative monoid. From (10) we have
F + G = −1. Following the same construction as in the proof of Theorem
4.1, except for the terms in the multiplicative monoid, one gets
V =
∑
all permutations{σ(α)}α∈{−1,1}n
 m1∑
r=1
t˜rf˜r +
∑
J⊆{m1+1,...,m1+m2}
s˜J
∏
r∈J
g˜r
 .
The incorrect evaluator now estimates E(V ) = 0, while for each realization
V = −1.
With payoff V , then, the incorrect evaluator perceives the game as fair,
while losing a constant unit amount. This is the Dutch Book mentioned in
the statement of the corollary.
Notice that in this case the amount lost is fixed, and as such known in
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advance of any calculation about the polynomials determining the Dutch
Book.
One way to certify inadmissibility of the requirements is to form a Dutch
Book using some of the g(x) ⊳ 0’s only. This is the case for the example in
Appendix A, in which there is a linear subsystem which has no solutions; in
such a case a simple linear programming technique leads to a linear combina-
tion of the equations certifying the inadmissibility of the requirements, and
a Dutch Book can be formed as in the corollary below, with just one copy
(see also Appendix E).
In fact, one can produce an inadmissibility certifying Dutch Book by
explicitly deriving a contradiction from the requirements and use it to con-
struct the Dutch Book. We say that a polynomial equation or inequality
f(y) ⊳ 0 implies the inequality a ≥ b between two polyomials a(y), b(y) if
a− b = t(y)f(y) where t is either some polynomial in the variables y for the
case in which ⊳ is =, or t is a sum of squares polynomial for the case in which
⊳ is ≥. The next corollary formalizes how we deduce contradictions with
probabilistic calculations; this is actually a very optimistic description, as we
are generally quite limited in deducing contradictions, and are hardly able
to use intuition about sum of squares polynomials in probabilistic settings.
Corollary 4.3. Given the system (9), suppose there are polynomials a1, . . . , an
in the variables y such that
1. a1, an ∈ R (i.e. they do not depend on y);
2. a1 < an;
3. for each k = 1, . . . , n − 1, ak(y) ≥ ak+1(y) is implied by one of the
relations in (9) with no strict inequality.
Then, assuming that it is possible to realize a finite but sufficiently large
number of independent, jointly perceivable copies of the collection of events,
one can form a Dutch Book as follows. Suppose that at step k the relation
fik⊳0 implies ak ≥ ak+1, and let tk be such that ak+1(y)−ak(y) = tk(y)fik(y).
Then v(y) = 1
an−a1
∑n−1
k=1 tkfik = −1; and the random variable V obtained as
in the proof of Theorem 4.1 is the payoff a Dutch Book.
Proof. Consider the following procedure. Start from a1; if fi1 ⊳0 implies a1 ≥
a2, then let t1 be the polynomial such that a1−a2 = t1fi1 ; then a1 = t1fi1+a2;
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continuing one gets a1 = t1fi1 + t2fi2 + a3 = · · · =
∑n−1
k=1 tkfik + an. Thus∑n−1
k=1 tkfik = a1 − an < 0 and v(y) = −1. By replacing the y variables with
indicator functions as in the proof of Theorem 4.1 one gets the payoff random
variable of a Dutch Book, since tkfik ≥ 0 in all cases, and an > a1.
An example is in Appendix E.
5. Continuous variables
Probabilities in the continuous case are characterized by the requirements
that Ω is some Borel subset of R or Rn, and A = BΩ, the Borel σ-algebra of
R or Rn restricted to Ω.
5.1. Generalized moments problem and nonstandard analysis
In the classic problem of moments one assigns a Borel subset Ω of R or Rn
and potential moments, and then looks for existence of random variables
(which are described by the requirements of being measurable real valued
functions) defined on Ω and satisfying the prescribed moments with respect
to the Lebesgue measure [ST1943, L10]. As the unknown is the distribution
of the random variable, this is a linear problem.
The solution is generally expressed in terms of Dutch Books, albeit ap-
parently not using this explicit terminology. In fact, the Riesz-Haviland
theorem, which can be used to identify the main conditions for existence of
solutions to moment problems, states that given values mk, k ∈ N
n and
a closed set Ω ⊆ Rn, there is a probability µ concentrated on Ω such
that
∫
Ω
xkµdx = mk if and only if the following happens: for a poly-
nomial p(x) =
∑
k∈Nn ak
∏n
i=1 x
ki
i in the variables x = (x1, . . . , xn) and
m = {mk}k∈Nn, we indicate p(m) =
∑
k∈Nn akmk; then p(m) ≥ 0 for ev-
ery polynomial p such that p(x) ≥ 0 for all x ∈ Ω. Suppose now that an
incorrect evaluator of probabilities assigns momentsmk to some random vari-
ables X taking values in Ω ⊆ Rn, but there is no probability environment
for these requirements. Then let p(x) be the polynomial, nonnegative on Ω,
for which the above condition fails, i.e. p(m) < 0. Then, V (X) = −p(X) is
a weak Dutch Book against the incorrect evaluator; in fact, s(he) evaluates
E(V ) = E(−p(X)) = −p(m) > 0, while in fact, for every possible value x of
the random variable X, V = −p(x) ≤ 0.
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This type of results can be easily generalized to situations in which, in-
stead of giving directly the (potential) moments of a distribution, polynomial
relations between such moments are assigned, provided that the relations in-
volve compact sets.
Theorem 5.1. Consider a countable collection of polynomials p = pi(m),
i ∈ N, in the variables m = {mk}k∈Nn, and requirements on a probability
µ that it is concentrated on a closed subset Ω ⊆ Rn and its moments mk =∫
Ω
xkµdx satisfy pi(m) ⊳i 0 for all i. If the ⊳i’s contain no strict inequalities
and there exists constants Mk,k ∈ N
n, such that if m is a solution of all the
pi(m) ⊳i 0’s then
mk ≤Mk for each k ∈ N
n, (13)
then there is a probability µ satisfying the requirements if and only if there is
no Dutch Book against the believer of the above relations.
In the classic moment problem all ⊳i’s are equalities, hence the relations
contain no strict inequalities and the mk’s are bounded; the condition is also
fulfilled if, for instance, all equations are of the form ak ≥ (mk − bk)
2, but
not if there are some ak < m
2
k
.
Proof. Let C(s) be the set ofm
(s)
k
which are solutions of the relations pi(m)⊳i0,
i = 1, . . . , s, and also satisfy (13); as there are no strict inequalities, the C(s)’s
form a decreasing sequence of compact sets in R∞ with product topology;
and, as (13) holds for all solutions of all relations pi(m)⊳i0, each such solution
belongs to C(s) = ∩si=1C
(i) for each s, and hence to ∩s∈NC
(s). The absence
of any probability satisfying the requirements might occur for two reasons:
either ∩s∈NC
(s) = ∅, or for each m ∈ ∩s∈NC
(s) there is no solution to the
moment problem with m = {mk}k∈N as values for the moments.
If ∩s∈NC
(s) = ∅ then there is an s such that C(s) is empty by completeness
of R. Which means that necessarily there is no solution to the polynomial
relations pi(x) ⊳i 0, i = 1, . . . , s. By the Positivstellensatz, there is a polyno-
mial v(x) = −1 such that the relations pi(x) ⊳i 0, i = 1, . . . , s imply v ≥ 0.
We ca now perform a construction analogous to the one in the proof of Theo-
rem 4.1, using enough mutually independent, jointly perceivable copies of the
random variables on Ω which have been identified by the incorrect evaluator;
as the expectation factorizes over the product of random variables depending
on mutually independent, jointly perceivable probability spaces, it is easily
seen that we get a strict Dutch Book V .
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If ∩s∈NC
(s) 6= ∅, then for each m˜ ∈ ∩s∈NC
(s) there is no solution to the
moment problem with the m˜k’s as values for the moments; hence for each
for each such m˜ there is a polynomial p(m˜), nonnegative on Ω, for which
p(m˜)(m˜) < 0. Each such polynomial determines an open set B(m˜) = {m :
p(m˜)(m) < 0}; and
{B(m˜)}m˜∈∩s∈NC(s)
is an open cover of the compact set ∩s∈NC
(s), from which we can extract
a finite subcover {B(m˜
(j))}j=1,...,r. The function v(x) = minj=1,...,r p
(m˜(j))(x)
is nonnegative on Ω, and yet v(m) < 0 in each solution m ∈ ∩s∈NC
(s).
Consider payoffs V = −v(X): then ≤ 0 for every realization x of X; on the
other hand, whatever m the incorrect evaluator deems the moments to be,
it will be p(m˜)(m) < 0 for some m˜, so
E(V (X)) = E( max
j=1,...,r
−p(m˜
(j))(X)
≥ E(−p(m˜)(X)) = −p(m˜)(m) > 0.
Hence, V is a Dutch Book.
The situation changes if there are strict inequalities in the pi(m) ⊳i 0’s
or the set of solutions is unbounded, as the set of possible moment values
is no longer compact. In such case, absence of a Dutch Book is compatible
with absence of a probability distribution satisfying the given constraints. In
fact, there might be a Loeb distribution on nonstandard reals [T2012] which
satisfies all the requirements.
Example 3. Let n = 1; p0 be m1 > 0; p2r be m1 ≤ 1/r; and p2r+1 be (m1)
r−
mr = 0, for r ∈ N. Clearly, there is no standard solution, but the atomic
Loeb distribution concentrated on the hyperreal (1, 1/2, . . . , 1/n, . . . )/U ∈ ∗R,
where U is a fixed ultrafilter, satisfies all the requirements.
It is likely to be the case that in the continuous case absence of a Dutch
Book is equivalent to the existence of a distribution on nonstandard numbers
which satisfies all the requirements.
On the other hand, if one wants to find a structure whose absence guaran-
tees existence of a standard solution to the moment problem in general form,
i.e. with possible strict inequalities, one would need to develop a modified
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version of Dutch Books: this situation, limited to the existence of a martin-
gale measure in absence of a modified version of arbitrage, has been solved
in [DS08].
5.2. A decidable fragment: poly-moments conditions for joint normals
Consistency of some collections of requirements is more manageable; in par-
ticular, satisfiability may become decidable in some other classes of problems
besides Elementary Probability. We briefly present one example below; it is
again based on semialgebraic geometry.
Consider the following requirements. Ω = R, A = BR, and P = e
−(
∏n
j=1 x
2
j )/2λ,
where λ is the Lebesgue measure; moreover, there are n random variables
X1, . . . , Xn satisfying:
Xi =
n∑
j=1
ai,jZj + bj for some ai,j, bj ∈ R (14)
where Zj are such that their joint distribution has density dP/dλ (in short,
the Zj’s are i.i.d. N(0, 1) and the Xi’s have joint normal distributions);
finally, the Xi’s satisfy∑
0≤ρi≤s, for i=1,...,n
ρk1,r ,...,kn,r(r)E(
n∏
i=1
X
ki,r
i ) ⊳ 0 (15)
for r = 1, . . . , R, where the ρk1,r ,...,kn,r(r)’s are given real constants, and the
ki,r’s and s are given integers. We call these probability environments poly-
moment conditions for joint normals. We have
Theorem 5.2. For given ρr’s and ki,r’s, it is decidable whether the require-
ments for joint normal distributions determine a probability environment or
not.
Proof. Substitute in (15) the expressions of Xi’s from (14) and expand. The
Zj’s are independent, and their moments are known: E(Z
k) = (k − 1)!! for
k even, and 0 otherwise. Therefore, we get R polynomial relations in the
variables ai,j and bj , for which the existence of a real solution is decidable as
described before. Once we have one selection of values for the ai,j’s and the
bj ’s, (14) gives the required concrete random variables.
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Notice that, to the opposite of Elementary Probability, it is not clear
under which conditions a system of polynomial relations is obtained from
the feasibility test of poly-moment conditions for joint normals.
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Appendix A. A contradictory set up
We present here a simple exercise taken from a widely used, application ori-
ented, very high quality textbook. In the exercise, which is set up so as
to mimic a realistic production problem, the authors propose a set of as-
sumptions about probabilities and ask for the calculation of several other
probabilities; the required calculations can be carried out without difficul-
ties; it is very likely that this exercise has been solved thousands of times.
What is problematic, however, is that on carrying out one extra calculation
one realizes that the actual set of assumptions is inconsistent. In [AT2006],
Exercise 2.8 page 67 presents the following problem.
Example 4. On a given day, casting of concrete structural elements at a
construction project depends on the availability of material. The required
material may be produced at the job site or delivered from a premixed concrete
supplier. However, it is not always certain that these sources of material will
be available. Furthermore, whenever it rains at the site, casting cannot be
performed. On a given day, define the following elements:
E1 = there will be no rain
E2 = production of concrete material at the job site is feasible
E3 = supply of premixed concrete is available
with the following respective probabilities: P (E1) = 0, 8, P (E2) = 0, 7,
P (E3) = 0, 95 and P (E3|E
c
2) = 0, 6 whereas E2 and E3 are statistically inde-
pendent of E1.
(a) Identify the following events in terms of E1, E2, and E3:
(i) A = casting of concrete elements can be performed on a given day;
(ii) B = casting of concrete elements cannot be performed on a given
day.
(b) determine the probability of the event B.
(c) If production of concrete material at the job site is not feasible, what is
the probability that casting of concrete elements can still be performed
on a given day?
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We just briefly mention the intended solution. It is implicitly assumed,
from the theory presented in the book, that all events are jointly perceivable.
(a) A = E1 ∩ (E2 ∪ E3) B = A
c = Ec1 ∪ (E
c
2 ∩ E
c
3);
(b) by the independence of (any combination of) E2, E3 from E1 we have
P (B) = 1− P (A) = 1− P (E1 ∩ (E2 ∪ E3))
= 1− P (E1)P (E2 ∪ E3).
Since E2 ∪ E3 = E2 ∪ (E
c
2 ∩ E3) and P (E
c
2 ∩ E3) = P (E3|E
c
2)P (E
c
2) =
0, 6× (1− 0, 7) = 0, 18, we have
P (B) = 1− (0, 8× (0, 7 + 0, 18)) = 1− 0, 704 = 0.296. (16)
(c) we have
P (A|Ec2) =
P (A ∩ Ec2)
P (Ec2)
=
P (E1 ∩ (E2 ∪ E3) ∩ E
c
2)
P (Ec2)
=
P (E1 ∩ E3 ∩ E
c
2)
P (Ec2)
=
P (E1)P (E3 ∩ E
c
2)
P (Ec2)
=
0, 8× 0, 18
0.3
= 0.48
Something, however, is not correct in this set up: we have P (E3 ∩E
c
2) =
P (E3|E
c
2)P (E
c
2) = 0.18 so that
P (E3 ∩ E2) = P (E3)− P (E3 ∩ E
c
2) = 0.77 > 0.7 = P (E2) (17)
which contradicts monotonicity of P . Alternatively, again from (16), P (E3∪
E2) = 0.88 < 0.95 = P (E3).
We conclude that the pre-environment described here is contradictory;
the contradiction does not appear in the intended calculations, which were
all obtained by sound applications of inference rules, but only with a careful
choice of the events to examine.
As a consequence of the contradiction, for every statement, including the
one in (16), the opposite can also be inferred: as P (E2∪E3) ≥ P (E3) = 0.95,
P (B) = 1− (0, 8× P (E2 ∪ E3)) ≤ 1− 0, 76 = 0.24 6= 0.296. (18)
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Appendix B. Analysis of the contradictory setup
The set up described in Appendix A proposes a probability environment,
which requires admissibility, a decidable question by Corollary 3.2. As an
illustration, we determine once again that the requirements in Appendix A
are contradictory directly by the algebraization method of Lemma 3.2 and
Corollary 3.2.
First, observe that there are three events involved, so that A = {E1, E2, E3}.
Then select a real variable for each of the boolean combinations on which
conditions are given; it is convenient to use the following notation:
xβ1,β2,β3 = P (E
β1
1 ∩ E
β2
2 ∩ E
β3
3 )
where βm ∈ {−1, 0, 1} and A
−1 = AC , A0 = Ω, A1 = A. The equations ex-
pressing the requirements of the probability environment are the following,
where we have assumed that the claimed independence is actually the full
independence of the algebra generated by E2 and E3 from the algebra gen-
erated by E1 (as it makes sense that the wheather is independent from any
combination of human productions):
x1,0,0 = 0.8
x0,1,0 = 0.7
x0,0,1 = 0.95
x1,1,1 = x1,1,0 · x0,0,1
x1,−1,1 = x1,−1,0 · x0,0,1
x−1,1,1 = x−1,1,0 · x0,0,1
x−1,−1,1 = x−1,−1,0 · x0,0,1
x0,−1,1 = 0.6 · x0,−1,0
(19)
With the trivial substitution x0,−1,0 = 1− x0,1,0 there are 12 variables in the
system.
Now make the change of variables
xβ1,β2,β3 =
∑
αm∈{βm+|βm|−1,βm−|βm|+1},m=1,2,3
yα1,α2,α3
where yα1,α2,α3 indicates the unknown probability of E
α1
1 ∩ E
α2
2 ∩E
α3
3 . After
substitution and the inclusion of the conditions on the yα’s the system has 9
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equations of degree either 1 or 2, and 8 inequalities. As discussed here below
there is no solution, indicating that the requirements are not admissible; a
certificate that the system has no solution is in Appendix E.
One can actually wonder if it was the value 0.95 required for P (E3) which
created a problem. In fact, one can leave x0,0,1 as an indeterminate and solve
the system in yα for the other 7 variables. The result, before imposing the
condition that yα ≥ 0 for all α’s, is:
y−1,1,1 = (21− 50y1,1,1)/50
y1,−1,1 = (12− 25y1,1,1)/25
y1,1,−1 = 2y1,1,1/3
y−1,−1,1 = (−3 + 10y1,1,1)/10
y−1,1,−1 = (21− 50y1,1,1)/75
y1,−1,−1 = (24− 50y1,1,1)/75
y−1,−1,−1 = (−3 + 10y1,1,1)/15.
With the nonegativity condition one has P (E1∩E2∩E3) = y1,1,1 ∈ [3/10, 21/50],
and P (E3) = y1,1,1 + y−1,1,1 + y1,−1,1 + y−1,−1,1 = 3/5. This amounts to the
cylindrical decomposition according to Tarsky-Seidenberg reduction theorem,
although it is better computed by directly solving the equations first.
In conclusion, only the value P (E3) = 3/5 is admissibile in this set up.
Appendix C. Example
simple situation in which our theory applies.
Example 5. Show that if five equiprobable collectively independent events
are such that the probability of each exceeds that of the overall intersection
by 0.5, then the probability that at least one event occurs can be bounded by
the sum of the probabilities of any three of them (instead of all five as would
follow from subadditivity). Show also that the probabilities of two of them are
not enough in the case above, but they are if the excess is 0.55 instead of 0.5.
Incorrect Solution C.1. Let Ai, i = 1, . . . , 5 indicate the five events, and
let a = P (Ai) − P (∩
5
i=1Ai) be the indicated excess. We start from a = 0.5.
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Denoting P (Ai) = z, by inclusion-exclusion, independence and equiprobabil-
ity, the probability that at least one event occurs satisfies
p(z, a) = P (∪5i=1Ai)
=
∑
P (Ai)−
∑
i1 6=i2
P (Ai1 ∩Ai2) +
∑
i1 6=i2 6=i3
P (Ai1 ∩ Ai2 ∩Ai3)
−
∑
i1 6=i2 6=i3 6=14
P (Ai1 ∩Ai2 ∩ Ai3 ∩Ai4) + P (∩
5
i=1Ai) (20)
= 5P (A1)− 10P (A1)
2 + 10P (A1)
3 − 5P (A1)
4 + P (A1)
5
= 6P (A1)− 10P (A1)
2 + 10P (A1)
3 − 5P (A1)
4 − a
= 6z − 10z2 + 10z3 − 5z4 − a.
1. We are then asked to prove that p(z, 0.5)−3z = 3z−10z2+10z3−5z4−
0.5 ≤ 0 for z ∈ [0, 1], which is easily shown by simple calculations. In
fact, p(z, 0.5)−3z ≤ 3z−10z2+10z3−3z4−0.5 = z(1−z)(3−7z+3z2)−
0.5, so it is sufficient to show that q(z) = z(3−7z+3z2)−0.5 ≤ 0, but
q(0), q(1) < 0, and q(z) computed at the root of q′(z) = 0 is negative.
2. On the other hand, p(0.3, 0.50) = 0.6295 > 2× 0.3, so that p(z, 0.5) ≤
2z does not hold for all z ∈ [0, 1]. Therefore, a bound by the probabilities
of two events is not sufficient.
3. Finally, we see that once again r(z) = p(z, 0.55) − 2z < 0 for z ∈
[0, 1]; in fact, r(0), r(1) < 0, r′′(z) < 0 as it is an irreducible second
order polynomial, and if z∗ indicates the only real root of r′(z) = 0,
computable by solving a third degree polynomial, then r(z∗) < 0. So, if
the excess a equals 0.55 then the probability of the union can be bounded
by the sum of two of the probabilities of the single events.
Improved Solution C.2. It is possible to verify the existence of a proba-
bility environment (Ω,A, P ) satisfying the requirementsby the algebraization
method in Corollary 3.2. Clearly, for this simple case there is plenty of short-
cuts, but, by way of exemplification, let’s follow the abstract scheme.
There are no requirements on Ω and A is required to be of size 5. So let
A = {Ai, i = 1, . . . , 5}, let a = P (Ai) − P (∩
5
i=1Ai) be the indicated excess,
and consider the boolean combinations Bβ = ∩i∈βAi for β ⊆ {1, 2 . . . , n}.
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The stated requirements are then expressed by the following system
x{1,2,3,4,5} + a− x{i} = 0, i = 1, . . . , 5
xβ −
∏
i∈β x{i} = 0, β ⊆ {1, 2 . . . , n}
x{i} − x{j} = 0, i, j = 1, . . . , 5, i 6= j.
(21)
Perform the change of variables xβ =
∑
α:αi=1 for i∈β
yα and add the normal-
ization and nonnegativity relations to get the system
y{1,1,1,1,1} + a−
∑
α:αi=1
yα = 0, i = 1, . . . , 5∑
α:αi=1 for i∈β
yα −
∏
i∈β
∑
α:αi=1
yα = 0, β ⊆ {1, 2 . . . , n}∑
α:αi=1
yα −
∑
α:αj=1
yα = 0, i, j = 1, . . . , 5, i 6= j∑
α∈{−1,1}5 yα − 1 = 0.
(22)
The nonemptiness of the semialgebraic set determined by the last system can
be determined by cylindric reduction according to Tarsky-Seidenberg elimina-
tion, or shortened by some substitution. Indicating by z the common value
of the
∑
α:αi=1
yα’s one gets to
z5 + a− z = 0∑
α:αi=1 for i∈β
yα − z
|β| = 0, β ⊆ {1, 2 . . . , n}∑
α∈{−1,1}n yα − 1 = 0.
(23)
For a = 0.5 one can show by Sturm’s theorem, or similar methods, that
there are indeed solutions in [0, 1] (see Remark C.3 below). Assuming z∗
is one such solution, then one can take a concrete probability space with 5
independent events, each with probability z∗, which is known to exist; in such
a space all requirements hold. Therefore, the probability environment is well
defined and Part 1. of the incorrect solution is actually correct.
On the other hand, if a = 0.55 then by the same algebraic methods above,
one can see that there is no solution of the first equation in [0, 1] (see Re-
mark C.3 below), and hence the assumptions about the excess being 0.55 are
contradictory, and the entire calculation in Part 3. of the incorrect solution
does not make any sense at all.
Notice that the the equation z5+a−z = 0 cannot be solved by radicals for
the given values of a; hence, the result about the roots is purely existential.
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Remark C.3. Notice also that Sturm’s theorem gives a condition on a for
the existence of a solution in [0, 1] of z5 + a − z = 0. The Sturm sequence
in z = 0 is a,−1,−a, 1 − 3125a
4
256
and in z = 1 is a, 4, 4/5 − a, 1 − 3125a
4
256
.
Hence, there are two solutions in [0, 1] for a ∈ [0, 4
55/4
), one for a = 4
55/4
and none for a > 4
55/4
. Hence, the requirements are admissible if and only if
a ≤ 4
55/4
≈ 0.535.
There is yet another twist in Part 2. of the incorrect solution. There, we
are trying to derive a negative result from the assumptions, so the consistency
of the assumptions of the probability environment is not enough; a complete
solution of the exercise uses the methods of Corollary 3.3
(Complete) Solution C.4. (to Example 5). According to the above corol-
lary, we augment System (21) by the equation x1∨2∨3∨4∨5 − 2x{1} > 0, where
x1∨2∨3∨4∨5 corresponds to P (A1∪A2∪A3∪A4∪A5). After the x-y change of
variables, and the same substitutions as in the improved solution, we get Sys-
tem (23) incremented by the inequality 1− (1− z)5− 2z > 0. Combined with
z−z5−0.5 = 0 this gives (1−z)5/2+z5 < 0, which is impossible to satisfy if
z ≥ 0. Since without the additional relation this is a probability environment,
it follows from Corollary 3.3 that P (A1∪A2 ∪A3 ∪A4 ∪A5) ≤ 2P (A1) holds
for a = 0.5, and that also Part 2. of the incorrect solution is wrong.
The point of the complete solution to Part 2. is that indeed p(z, 0.5) ≤ 2z
does not hold for all z ∈ [0, 1], but it holds for all the z’s for which the
hypothesis make sense.
Appendix D. Example of Dutch Book
Example 6. An incorrect evaluator of the probabilities of two events A1 and
A2 might assume that: they are independent, all their boolean combinations
are jointly perceivable, P (A1|A2) = 1/2, and, finally, that P (A1) 6= 1/2.
Setting xβ1,β2 = P (A
β1
1 ∩ A
β2
2 ) the above equirements give rise to a system
with 4 terms 
x1,1 − x1,0x0,1 = 0
x1,1 −
1
2
x0,1 = 0
x0,1 6= 0
x1,0 −
1
2
6= 0.
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After substitution with the yα’s, one gets a system with 9 terms, m1 = 3 equa-
tions, m2 = 4 inequalities, and m3 = 2 with ⊳ replaced by 6=. A polynomial
certifying that there is no solution is
v =
2∑
r=1
trfr +
9∏
r=8
(hr)
2
=
(
(y1,1 + y−1,1)(y1,1 + y1,−1 −
1
2
)
)(
y1,1 − (y1,1 + y1,−1)(y1,1 + y−1,1)
)
+
(
−(y1,1 + y−1,1)(y1,1 + y1,−1 −
1
2
)
)(
y1,1 −
1
2
(y1,1 + y−1,1)
)
+(y1,1 + y−1,1)
2(y1,1 + y1,−1 −
1
2
)2 ≡ 0.
Now following steps 1.-6. in the proof of the Theorem 4.1 for a fixed set of
permutations, we get
t˜2f˜2 =
(
−I
1,1,(σ
(1,1)
1 )
I
1,1,(σ
(1,1)
2 )
− I
1,1,(σ
(1,1)
1 )
I
1,−1,(σ
(1,−1)
5 )
+
1
2
I
1,1,(σ
(1,1)
1 )
−I
1,1,(σ
(1,1)
1 )
I
−1,1,(σ
(−1,1)
7 )
− I
−1,1,(σ
(−1,1)
7 )
I
1,−1,(σ
(1,−1)
5 )
+
1
2
I
−1,1,(σ
(−1,1)
7 )
)
·
(
1
2
I
1,1,(σ
(1,1)
3 )
−
1
2
I
−1,1,(σ
(−1,1)
8 )
)
and u˜ and V accordingly. One can see that there is no easy way of controlling
the different copies which are used, except that of taking all permutations.
On the other hand, one can construct a simpler and more direct payoff by
identifying the events as much as possible with the original Ai’s, rather than
with their expansion in standard normal form, and by a clever choice of the
copies. Here is a possible form (in which the number of the copy is indicated
in the indices):
V ′ =
(
IA2,(1)(IA1,(3) −
1
2
)
)(
IA1∩A2,(2) − IA1,(4) IA2,(2)
)
+
(
−IA2,(1)(IA1,(3) −
1
2
)
)(
IA1∩A2,(2) −
1
2
IA2,(2)
)
+IA2,(1)(IA1,(3) −
1
2
)(IA1,(4) −
1
2
).
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Since in each factor of each product there appear only events belonging to
copies which are different from those appearing in the other factors (of the
same product), independence can be used to show that E(V ′) > 0 for the
incorrect evaluator; on the other hand, V ′ ≡ 0 as checked by simple algebraic
expansion.
Appendix E. A short cut Dutch Book
Example 7. According to Corollary 4.3, it is possible to use a known con-
tradiction to build a Dutch Book. We do it for the contradiction found at the
end of Appendix A for the problem presented there, using the formalization
in Appendix B. The chain of deductions leading to the contradiction in (17),
in the notation of Appendix B is the following:
x0,1,1 − (x0,0,1 − x0,−1,1) = 0
x0,0,1 − 0.95 = 0
x0,−1,1 − 0.6x0,−1,0 = 0
x0,−1,0 − (1− x0,1,0) = 0
x0,1,0 − 0.7 = 0
x0,1,0 − x0,1,1 ≥ 0
x0,1,0 − 0.7 = 0
Notice that the fifth and the seventh equations coincide, as this relation ap-
pears twice in the reasoning expressing the contradiction. Now, we combine
these relations with suitable coefficients in such a way that the single variables
are telescopically canceled; we can use any real coefficient for all relations ex-
cept the sixth, which needs a nonnegative coefficient. We indicate directly the
random variables, as all relations are linear and there is no need of using
copies; moreover, we directly replace the x variables by a random variable,
as we already expressed the properties of probability in equations number 1, 4
and 6. Ii,j,k is the random variable substituting the variable xi,j,k. The payoff
of the Dutch Book is
v˜ =
1
0.07
[(I0,1,1 − (I0,0,1 − I0,−1,1)) + (I0,0,1 − 0.95)
−(I0,−1,1 − 0.6I0,−1,0)− 0.6(I0,−1,0 − (1− I0,1,0))
+0.6(I0,1,0 − 0.7) + (I0,1,0 − I0,1,1)− (I0,1,0 − 0.7) = −1.
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Appendix F. Paradoxes
Wemake a brief reference to the so called paradoxes, many of which have been
proposed concerning the foundations of probability theory (see, for instance,
[E2012, Ha2013]). The point in most of the paradoxes in probability is that
one ether sets up contradictory collection of assumptions, or is forced by
too rigid axiom systems to assign probabilities where there is no natural
way of doing it. Both problems are addressed and solved by probability
environments.
As just one example of how our formulation can deal with paradoxical
settings, we consider Humphrey’s paradox [Hu1985] and its variants [Ly2014],
which turn out to be troubling for most foundations of probability. The
paradox gives reasons to make assumptions about some events Bt0 , It1 , Tt2 ,
namely
(i) P (Tt2|It1 ∩ Bt0) = p > 0,
(ii) 1 > P (It1|Bt0) = q > 0,
(iii) P (Tt2|¬It1 ∩Bt0) = 0;
each variant gives then reasons to make an assumption about P (It1 |Tt2∩Bt0),
for instance that it equals P (It1|¬Tt2∩Bt0) = P (It1 |Bt0) in the first variant. It
can be easily seen that the statements of the first three variants of the paradox
are simply setting forth an inconsistent collection of requirements, easily
detectable by algebraization. In each case, a Dutch Book can be produced
against the believer of such assumptions: in the first variant, for instance,
it can be obtained as follows. Let IA,j, j = 1, 2 be the indicator function of
the event A in copy j, for two independent copies of the events. Then, by
omitting the (mathematically irrelevant) indications of the times t0, t1, t2, let
V = IB,1IT,2IB,2(1− q) + (IT,2IB,2II,1IB,1 − IB,1IT,2II,2IB,2)
+(IT,2IB,2qIB,1 − IT,2IB,2II,1IB,1)− IB,1IT,2(1− II,2)IB,2;
46
we have
E(V ) = P (B)P (T ∩ B)(1− q)
+(P (T ∩B)P (I ∩B)− P (B)P (T ∩ I ∩ B))
+(P (T ∩B)qP (B)− P (T ∩ B)P (I ∩ B))− P (B)P (T ∩ Ic ∩B)
= P (B)P (T ∩ B)(1− q)
+(P (T ∩B)P (I ∩B)− P (B)P (T ∩B))
+(P (T ∩B)qP (B)− P (T ∩ B)P (I ∩ B)).
From the requirements we know P (T ∩B) ≥ P (T ∩ I ∩B) = pP (I ∩B) > 0
and P (B) > 0; the first term is strictly positive, and all the other terms in
the r.h.s. of the last equation are 0; hence from the requirements, E(V ) > 0.
On the other hand, a simple expansion shows that V ≡ 0. Therefore, V is a
weak Dutch Book, witnessing the inconsistency of the requirements.
The fourth variant of the paradox suggests to leave P (It1|Tt2 ∩ Bt0) as
”undefined”. We can translate this assumption into the setting of probability
environments by stating that no requirement is made on such probability. In
such case, the other requirements are consistent, and the paradoxical nature
of the example disappears; a probability environment exists, and the last
probability can then be computed as necessary consequence of the other
requirements in such environment, necessarily taking the value P (It1 |Tt2 ∩
Bt0) = 1 (as easily seen by algebra or by Bayes formula).
All of the most relevant formalizations of Probability Theory seem to
be affected by Humphrey’s paradox, as they force us to assign a value to
P (It1|Tt2 ∩Bt0) before hand, hence entering in one of the three contradictory
variants. Only Re´nyi’s axiom system allows to leave such probability as
undefined, and hence is able to ”respond” to the paradox, reaching the same
conclusion as with probability environments.
In a further extension of the paradox (see [Ly2014] Section 6.6), though,
one can set up things in such a way that also Re´nyi’s axiom system would be
forced to assign values which should remain undefined; the issue is immaterial
for probability environments, which then solve extension of the paradox as
well.
.
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